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Background: In view of ongoing pandemic threats such as the recent human cases of novel avian influenza A
(H7N9) in China, it is important that all countries continue their preparedness efforts. Since 2006, Central American
countries have received donor funding and technical assistance from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) to build and improve their capacity for influenza surveillance and pandemic preparedness. Our
objective was to measure changes in pandemic preparedness in this region, and explore factors associated with
these changes, using evaluations conducted between 2008 and 2012.
Methods: Eight Central American countries scored their pandemic preparedness across 12 capabilities in 2008,
2010 and 2012, using a standardized tool developed by CDC. Scores were calculated by country and capability and
compared between evaluation years using the Student’s t-test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, respectively. Virological
data reported to WHO were used to assess changes in testing capacity between evaluation years. Linear regression
was used to examine associations between scores, donor funding, technical assistance and WHO reporting.
Results: All countries improved their pandemic preparedness between 2008 and 2012 and seven made statistically
significant gains (p < 0.05). Increases in median scores were observed for all 12 capabilities over the same period
and were statistically significant for eight of these (p < 0.05): country planning, communications, routine influenza
surveillance, national respiratory disease surveillance, outbreak response, resources for containment, community
interventions and health sector response. We found a positive association between preparedness scores and
cumulative funding between 2006 and 2011 (R2 = 0.5, p < 0.01). The number of specimens reported to WHO from
participating countries increased significantly from 5,551 (2008) to 18,172 (2012) (p < 0.01).
Conclusions: Central America has made significant improvements in influenza pandemic preparedness between
2008 and 2012. U.S. donor funding and technical assistance provided to the region is likely to have contributed to
the improvements we observed, although information on other sources of funding and support was unavailable to
study. Gains are also likely the result of countries’ response to the 2009 influenza pandemic. Further research is
required to determine the degree to which pandemic improvements are sustainable.
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In 2006, the World Health Organization (WHO) pub-
lished the revised International Health Regulations
(IHR) (2005) in response to an increase in global travel
and trade and the emergence and re-emergence of infec-
tious diseases, such as avian influenza [1]. These regula-
tions provided an updated legal framework to guide the
international community in the prevention and mitiga-
tion of acute public health risks, including pandemic in-
fluenza. The revised IHR became legally binding in June
2007 with the expectation that Member States would
implement the recommendations within five years. In
the intervening period, the world experienced its first
influenza pandemic in over 30 years with the global cir-
culation of Influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 virus [2].
Low and middle-income countries face greater chal-
lenges in preparing for pandemic influenza than high-
income countries [3] and, in the event of a pandemic,
they are thought to be at risk of higher mortality rates
[4,5]. Central America is a region of middle-income coun-
tries: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Panama. Since 2006, these seven countries,
together with the Dominican Republic, have been the
recipients of technical assistance and funding from the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to de-
velop their influenza surveillance capacity and pandemic
preparedness. In addition, the WHO has published a num-
ber of strategy and guidance documents to support coun-
tries in their efforts to develop and strengthen pandemic
preparedness [5-10]. These documents include the Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO) and CDC generic
protocol for influenza surveillance, published in 2006 to
specifically help countries in the Latin American region
standardize their surveillance systems [10].
In 2008, CDC published an assessment tool to help
countries determine the status of their influenza pan-
demic preparedness across twelve capabilities; functions,
resources or activities identified as critical to pandemic
preparedness and response [11]. WHO describes pre-
paredness as the ability to detect zoonotic and human
influenza viruses, respond to widespread disease should it
occur, and minimize the impact of disease on the economy
and society [6]. The content of the tool was developed dur-
ing 2006 and 2007, in the context of WHO recommenda-
tions for national pandemic preparedness, including the
IHR (2005), as well as the best available science and prac-
tice standards for preparedness at the time. The principle
aim of the tool has been to help countries and their donor
partners identify opportunities for improvement so that
funding and technical assistance can be targeted to further
develop and enhance pandemic preparedness.
The purpose of this study was to measure changes in
pandemic preparedness in Central America using evalu-
ations conducted in eight countries which took place in2008, 2010 and 2012. We also explored factors associ-
ated with these changes including the 2009 influenza
pandemic and, U.S. CDC technical assistance and
funding provided to the region since 2006.
Methods
This study was determined not to be human subjects’ re-
search; data about a human that cannot be linked back
to the human is exempt [12]. Our data sources included
1) information collected during evaluation of country
programs which was in a manner that subjects cannot
be identified and 2) information from existing, publicly
available data sets.
Study population
The countries in this study included: Belize, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. For the purposes of
this paper, the terms ‘Central America’ and ‘Central
American countries’ refer to these eight countries.
Data collection tool
CDC’s National Inventory of Core Capabilities for
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Tool
[11] assesses 12 specific operational capabilities of pan-
demic preparedness: country planning, research and
use of findings for pandemic influenza preparedness,
communications, epidemiologic capability, laboratory cap-
ability, routine influenza surveillance, national respiratory
disease surveillance and reporting, outbreak response, re-
sources for containment, community-based interventions
to prevent the spread of influenza, infection control, and
health sector pandemic response. The titles for some
of these capabilities have been truncated or adapted
throughout the paper for practicality and clarity, for
example, ‘research and use of findings for pandemic in-
fluenza preparedness’ is referred to as ‘research’.
Each capability is composed of four indicators which
describe specific health activities or public health func-
tions related to that capability. These indicators are mea-
sured on a scale of zero to three where zero corresponds
to very limited capability, one represents a low level of cap-
ability, two corresponds to a moderate level of capability
and three indicates an advanced level of preparedness. A
short description defines the minimum requirements for
attaining each performance level (0, 1, 2 or 3) and these re-
quirements range from defining the simple presence or ab-
sence of a public health activity, resource or function to
increasing levels of coverage, timeliness or quality for that
indicator [11] (Additional file 1: Table S1). One of the four
indicators for two capabilities in the tool, ‘country planning’
and ‘health sector pandemic response’, is a split-indicator
which is composed of two components. Each component is
scored as described for each indicator (i.e. 0, 1, 2 or 3) and
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aging the two component scores.
Data collection
Each country’s level of influenza pandemic preparedness
was measured in 2008, 2010 and 2012. Implementation
of the tool requires the participation of persons respon-
sible for pandemic preparedness in a country; partici-
pants were identified by the ministry of health from
each country in partnership with CDC. They included,
among others: epidemiologists, influenza laboratory staff,
risk communication experts, emergency and disaster re-
sponse personnel, health-care providers, and animal and
environmental health experts, as well as, partners such as
WHO, the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International
Development and local non-government organizations.
The self-assessment process was facilitated by a CDC rep-
resentative and took place over one to two days. The 12
capabilities were discussed among the participants
until a consensus was reached regarding the score to
assign to each of the 48 corresponding indicators per
country. If necessary, participants accessed country-
specific data sources such as their national pandemic
preparedness plans or laboratory reports, to assist with
their decision-making. Prior to their participation, countries
were informed that the evaluations were voluntary and that
data collected through the tool would only be published
anonymously or in aggregate.
Pandemic tool data analyses
Scores for each capability were calculated by taking the
sum of their four respective indicators. Pandemic pre-
paredness scores for each country were calculated as a
percentage by summing the scores for each of the 12
capabilities and dividing the totals by the maximum
score possible (12 capabilities × 4 indicators ×maximum
indicator score of 3 = 144). Percentage scores by capabil-
ity were determined by calculating the median score for
the eight countries for each capability, and dividing by
the maximum score possible for a capability (4 indica-
tors ×maximum indicator score of 3 = 12). Missing data
were given a score of zero. Higher percentage scores
denote greater levels of preparedness. Scores were com-
pared across years using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
Linear regression was used to explore associations be-
tween funding and pandemic preparedness scores. All
statistical analysis was performed using Stata MP Ver-
sion 11 (StataCorp LP, College Station, U.S.).
Funding and technical assistance data analyses
We accessed data from the CDC-Central America Regional
Office to determine the allocation of budgeted influenza
and pandemic preparedness funds and provision of tech-
nical assistance to the eight countries between 2006 and2012. We used linear regression to analyze the association
between cumulative funding and pandemic preparedness
scores for each country. To account for the likely delay
between preparedness budgeting and expenditure, we
regressed 2006-2007, 2006-2009 and 2006-2011 funding
data against 2008, 2010 and 2012 scores, respectively. Tech-
nical assistance was calculated by summing the months of
service provided by cooperative agreement-funded staff
to each country, pro rata. We used linear regression to
analyze the association between cumulative technical assist-
ance and pandemic preparedness scores for each country;
technical assistance up to and including the month prior to
an evaluation was regressed against the score for each
evaluation.
WHO FluNet data analyses
We extracted data from the WHO influenza virological
surveillance database, FluNet, to determine the number
of influenza specimens reported from Central America
between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2012 [13].
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum test was used to compare
changes in the number of specimens reported over time.
Linear regressions were performed to establish the rela-
tionship between 2008 pandemic scores and FluNet
specimens reported in 2007-8, 2009-10 and 2011-12,
respectively, with the aim of evaluating the association
between baseline scores and a measurable outcome of
influenza-related activity (i.e. increased reporting being
indicative of influenza testing capacity which is, in turn,
representative of preparedness).
Results
Trends in pandemic preparedness between 2008 and 2012
In 2008, countries scored epidemiology (median 71%,
[IQR 63–79]), laboratory (median 54%, [50-83]) and routine
influenza surveillance (median 50%, [42–69]) capabilities as
most developed and community interventions (median
21%, [8–25]), research (median 21%, [8–58]), and health
sector response (2%, [0–9]) capabilities as least developed
(Figure 1, Table 1). The highest preparedness score for a
country in 2008 was 59% and the lowest was 12%.
In 2012, countries scored routine influenza surveillance
(median 100%, [IQR 98–100]), communications (median
92%, [75–92]), national respiratory disease surveillance
(median 88%, [81-94]) and outbreak response (median 88%,
[73–94]) capabilities as most developed and resources for
containment (median 58%, [56–73], research (median 50%,
[25–77]) and health sector response (median 40%, [33–63])
capabilities as least developed (Figure 1, Table 1). The high-
est preparedness score for a country in 2012 was 90% and
the lowest was 59%.
Increases in median scores were observed for all 12
capabilities between 2008 and 2012 and were statistically
significant for eight of these: country planning (p < 0.05),
Figure 1 Median scores and changes in median scores for pandemic preparedness by capability combined for 8 Central
American countries.
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lance (p < 0.05), national respiratory disease surveillance
(<0.05), outbreak response (p < 0.05), resources for con-
tainment (p < 0.05), community interventions (p < 0.05)
and health sector response (p < 0.01). Analyses by country
showed a statistically significant increase in pandemicTable 1 Median influenza pandemic preparedness scores
by capability for 2008, 2010 and 2012
Pandemic capability Median scores [IQR]
2008 2010 2012
Country Planning 29% [19, 52] 67% [48,78] 67% [58,71]*
Research 21% [8, 58] 46% [42,63] 50% [25,77]
Communications 25% [19, 60] 79% [73,88] 92% [75,92]*
Epidemiology 71% [63, 79] 79% [67,85] 75% [63,77]
Laboratory 54% [50, 83] 75% [67,83] 75% [71,83]
Routine Surveillance 50% [42, 69] 96% [90,100] 100% [98,100]*
National Surveillance 25% [19, 42] 67% [58,77] 88% [81,94]*
Outbreak Response 38% [29, 50] 83% [79,100] 88% [73,94]*
Containment 42% [29, 50] 67% [58,77] 58% [56,73]*
Community Interventions 21% [8, 25] 54% [38,63] 79% [67,100]*
Infection Control 25% [17, 44] 50% [31,77] 79% [56,88]*
Health Sector Response 2% [0, 9] 48% [45,60] 40% [33,63]†
*Difference in median score between 2008 and 2012 is statistically significant
at p ≤ 0.05 (Wilcoxon Rank Test).
†Difference in median score between 2008 and 2012 is statistically significant
at p ≤ 0.01 (Wilcoxon Rank Test).preparedness for seven of the eight countries (p < 0.05)
between 2008 and 2012.
Funding, technical assistance and pandemic preparedness
From 2006 to 2011, the eight countries we studied were al-
located a median of 335,000 [IQR 253,000-360,000] USD
per year in cooperative agreement funding from CDC. This
funding was distributed among surveillance activities (49%),
laboratory activities (8%), research (18%) and other pre-
paredness activities (26%). We found a positive association
between pandemic scores in 2008, 2010 and 2012 and
cumulative funding from 2006-2007, 2006-2009 and 2006-
2011, respectively (R2 = 0.5 (i.e. 50% of the variance in
scores was explained by cumulative funding) p < 0.01)
(Figure 2). Each country has also benefitted from a median
of 6.0 [5.7-6.9] person-years of technical assistance between
January 2006 and April 2012. We found a positive associ-
ation between pandemic preparedness scores and cumula-
tive technical assistance (R2 = 0.2, p < 0.05) however, this
association was no longer significant when funding was
included in the regression; scores and funding remained
significantly associated (R2 = 0.6, p < 0.001). Technical
assistance and funding were themselves highly corre-
lated (R2 = 0.6, p < 0.001).
Laboratory capabilities in 2012
Between 2008 and 2012, two national laboratories were
designated as WHO National Influenza Centres (NICs),
Figure 2 Pandemic preparedness scores 2008, 2010 and 2012 and cumulative funding received from 2006 to 2011.
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in 2012 (Table 2). The national laboratories of all eight
countries utilize indirect fluorescent antibody (IFA) assays
to detect influenza and seven have introduced quantitative
reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR)
testing since 2006 (Table 2). Seven countries use IFA testing
to detect influenza at local hospitals, three of which
also use qRT-PCR (Table 2). In 2012, six of the eight
countries we studied were performing virus isolation
and characterization (Table 2).
WHO FluNet reporting between 2008 and 2012
In 2008, five countries reported processing 5,551 specimens
(median 328, IQR 0–765) while in 2012, seven countriesTable 2 Laboratory capabilities for identification of seasonal
Country NIC* (year
designated)
IFA† National Lab IFA Hospital
Lab (# sites)
Panama yes (2007) yes Yes (2)
Nicaragua yes (2009) yes Yes (2)
Honduras yes (2007) yes Yes (2)
Guatemala yes (2009) yes Yes (3)
El Salvador yes (2005) yes Yes (3)
Dominican Republic No yes Yes (1)
Costa Rica yes (2006) yes Yes (3)
Belize No yes No (0)
Total (Regional) 6 8 16
*National Influenza Centre.
†Indirect Fluorescent Antibody Assay.
‡Quantitative reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction.reported processing 18,172 specimens (median 2,089,
[1,380–2,997]) (p < 0.01) (Figure 3). We found a positive as-
sociation between baseline pandemic preparedness scores
and FluNet specimens processed for 2007-8 (R2 = 0.3),
2009-10 (R2 = 0.6, p < 0.05) and 2011-12 (R2 = 0.6, p < 0.05),
respectively (Figure 4).
Discussion
Central America has made significant improvements in in-
fluenza pandemic preparedness between 2008 and 2012. In
particular, we measured significant gains in the following
areas determined to be critical to pandemic preparedness:
country planning, national respiratory disease surveillance,
resources for containment, communications, routineand pandemic influenza in Central America in 2012
qRT-PCR‡ National Lab
(year introduced)
RT-PCR Hospital Lab Virus isolation
Yes (2007) Yes (1) Yes (1978)
Yes (2006) No Yes (2007)
Yes (2009) No Yes (2007)
Yes (2009) Yes (1) Yes (2002)
Yes (2009) No Yes (2003)
Yes (2009) No No
Yes (2008) Yes (1) Yes (2004)
No No No
7 3 7
Figure 3 Number of specimens processed and reported to FluNet for seven Central American countries from January 1, 2008 to
December 31, 2012.
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based interventions and health sector response.
Since 2006, U.S. CDC has provided funding to Central
America for influenza surveillance and pandemic pre-
paredness, which we found to be significantly associated
with overall pandemic preparedness scores between
2008 and 2012. The greatest proportion of funding
(49%) supported surveillance activities, which might, in
part, explain the significant improvements we found in
‘routine influenza surveillance’ and ‘national respiratory
disease surveillance’ capabilities between 2008 and 2012.
Improvements in these capabilities reflect greater inte-
gration of epidemiological and virological data, an in-
crease in sentinel sites, more timely data analysis and
reporting, improved cross-notification between minis-
tries of health and agriculture and heightened public
awareness and reporting of severe respiratory illness.
While the improvement observed in ‘laboratory cap-
ability’ for the region was not statistically significant, the
proportion of funding allocated to laboratory activities
over the period was only 8%. Furthermore, the median
baseline score for this capability was relatively high at
54% leaving less room for large improvements to be
made. Nevertheless, the increase in reporting to FluNet
(Figure 3), the expansion of influenza laboratory tech-
niques (Table 2), and attainment of NIC status in two
countries’ national laboratories between 2008 and 2012,
is indicative of laboratory improvements taking place
during the study period.
In the same period that Central America received
funding from CDC, the region allocated a portion of this
funding to hiring staff with expert knowledge in influenza,
mostly epidemiologists, who were embedded in eachcountry’s ministry of health. In addition, one staff member
spent 40% of their time providing technical assistance
across the region. Total technical assistance amounted to
5.7 person-years per country between 2006 and 2011 and
included: training in epidemiological methods for surveil-
lance and laboratory techniques (IFA, qRT-PCR and cell
culture for virus isolation), data analysis and management,
rapid response and preparedness, advice for establishing
new sentinel sites as well as specific support to ministries of
health and NICs during the 2009 pandemic.
Technical assistance was not significantly associated
with preparedness scores when it was included as an ex-
planatory variable with funding; however, our funding
data included salaries for technical assistance. Since
funding and technical assistance were found to be highly
correlated, we suggest technical assistance is likely to
have contributed to the improvement observed in overall
pandemic preparedness in the region and that its ex-
planatory effect has largely been accounted for by the
funding variable.
The occurrence of the 2009 influenza pandemic is
likely to have contributed to the gains made in pandemic
preparedness capabilities during the study period since
the greatest improvements in scores were observed be-
tween 2008 and 2010. During 2009 and 2010 countries
executed their pandemic preparedness plans; they acti-
vated their rapid response teams, increased surveillance,
laboratory testing and reporting, distributed public health
messages through print media, radio and television and
set-up call centers or public hotlines. They also mobi-
lized anti-viral stockpiles where available, enhanced in-
fection control procedures in hospitals and clinics and
coordinated their response with other sectors: education,
Figure 4 Pandemic preparedness scores in 2008 and specimens
processed as reported to WHO FluNet in 2007 and 2008 (A), 2009
and 2010 (B), 2011 and 2012 (C), respectively.
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military (Wilfrido Clará, personal communication, 12/
03/13). While improvements in preparedness were
likely precipitated by the 2009 pandemic response, in-
creased reporting to FluNet prior to 2009 suggests thatsome improvements preceded the pandemic; in 2006,
three of the countries we studied reported processing a
total of 615 specimens to WHO FluNet which in-
creased to five countries reporting a total of 5,551 by
the end of 2008. FluNet reporting is indicative of a
country’s influenza surveillance and laboratory cap-
acity, including their ability to collect and test speci-
mens for influenza. In addition, the step increase in the
positive association between 2008 pandemic preparedness
scores and specimens reported to FluNet prior to (2007-8)
and following the pandemic (2009-2010, 2011-12) suggests
that preparedness activities prior to the pandemic were, to
some extent, predictive of a country’s ability to respond.
In 2012, countries scored their preparedness for research
(50%), resources for containment (58%) and health sector
response (40%) as least developed. These results may sug-
gest the need for greater investments and longer time-
frames to make progress in some capabilities over others.
For example, to make improvements in the ‘health sector
response’ capability, as defined by the tool, required greater
surge capacity for human resources, hospital beds and
ventilators, while improving ‘resources for containment’
required enhanced antiviral stockpiling and distribu-
tion. In low- and middle-income countries, there is
typically a shortage of health care staff, hospital infrastruc-
ture is limited and often inadequate, and resources, such as
ventilators and antivirals, are scarce [3,14]. To make im-
provements in the capability of ‘research’, required greater
collaboration between human and animal health sectors,
use of research data to inform preparedness decisions, the
allocation of funding to address research priorities, and ac-
tive scientific engagement, for example, through attendance
at conferences and the publication of findings. Investment
in research is low in Central America [15] while engage-
ment with research communities and access to scientific
knowledge is known to be limited in low and middle-
income countries [16]. Further to this, research requires a
highly skilled labour force which is a challenge where
gross enrollment in tertiary education ranges between
15% in Guatemala and Honduras to 50% in Costa Rica
and Panama, and where tertiary completion rates are
low [17].
Prior studies describing the state of country or regional-
level pandemic preparedness have used the WHO pan-
demic planning checklist to assess preparedness at a single
point in time [7,18-20]. For example, in 2006, Central
American countries used a modified version of the WHO
checklist and assessed their preparedness lowest for ‘main-
taining essential services’ and highest for ‘implementation,
testing and revision of national plans’ [21]. A separate study
in Latin America from 2008 which evaluated the complete-
ness of national strategic plans also used the WHO check-
list and found surveillance and communications were
adequately addressed but the health care sector and public
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we also found countries to be stronger in routine influenza
surveillance (50%) and communications (25%) than in
health sector response (2%).
There are some limitations to our study. First, we used
budgeted funding data which may not represent final ex-
penditure between different preparedness activities. Second,
we cannot readily separate the effect of technical assistance
from funding on pandemic preparedness scores because
our funding data includes a large component of technical
assistance, namely, staff salaries. Third, the countries we
studied are likely to have received some funding and tech-
nical assistance from sources other than CDC, and may
have mobilized national resources for preparedness, par-
ticularly during the 2009 pandemic; any additional funds
and resources would also contribute to the gains we ob-
served in preparedness over the period. Fourth, we report
an association between funding and pandemic prepared-
ness only; the study was not designed to establish causation.
Fifth, it is difficult to measure the extent to which the 2009
pandemic response supported the improvements we ob-
served in preparedness, particularly between 2008 and
2010. Finally, we have not compared the countries we stud-
ied with countries that were not funded by, and did not re-
ceive technical assistance from, CDC over the same period.
While self-assessments may be vulnerable to responder
bias, steps were taken to minimize this; a variety of people
were involved from each country, primary data sources
were used to inform decision making, and the rating levels
for each indicator were mostly well defined.
While not statistically significant, we saw the erosion
of gains made in some capabilities between 2010 and
2012 (Figure 1); further studies might explore factors which
determine the sustainability of pandemic preparedness. The
extent to which pandemic preparedness predicts health
outcomes associated with influenza infection is difficult to
measure where morbidity and mortality data is not rou-
tinely collected [5]. Additional research would be required
to examine the impact of preparedness activities on influ-
enza deaths and disabilities in Central America.
Conclusions
Central American countries have made significant im-
provements in pandemic preparedness between 2008
and 2012. U.S. donor funding and technical assistance
for influenza surveillance and pandemic preparedness,
provided to the region since 2006 is likely to have con-
tributed to these changes, suggesting that bilateral sup-
port for Central America in this area of public health
has been important and successful. The gains in pre-
paredness we observed may also be attributed to in-
creased activity associated with the 2009 influenza
pandemic although there is evidence that some improve-
ments preceded this event. The participation of theregion in WHO GISRS, as evidenced by increased
reporting to FluNet and NIC attainment during the
study period, demonstrates the commitment of Central
American countries to the IHR (2005). While progress
in pandemic preparedness has been made in Central
America in recent years, there is a need to determine
the degree to which these gains are sustainable and the
impact they may have on influenza morbidity and mor-
tality. In view of ongoing pandemic threats such as the
recent human cases of novel avian influenza A(H7N9) in
China, it is important that Central American countries
continue to invest in pandemic preparedness activities.
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